Introduction
The two crashes that involved the Boeing 737 Max plane led to investigations that showcased the shortcomings in the actions and operations of the Company. After the grounding of the jet, there are several; lessons that the organization was able to learn from the investigation carried out by the authorities on the causes of the two fatal plane crashes involving jets belonging to Indonesian and Ethiopian airlines. This report presents the lessons learned from the recall of the 737 Max jet and the grounding of operation in Boeing.
Lessons learned
Changes in the organization
Operations and Production
The grounded of the jet led the organization to re-examine its operations and production at the time that led to the plane crashes. The Company now emphasizes producing their jet with more effort put into the retesting and components before being signed off by the proper authority. The Company’s production system has been redesigned to ensure that all phases of in-plane model assembly and testing are well monitored and executed according to the right protocol of operations.
Regulatory Changes
After the grounding of its 737 Max jet, the Company has increased its association with the relevant authorities to ensure that its new jet meets all the standards to ensure safety during travel. The Company has established regulations for its departments in designing components for new jets; each model, before approval, must meet the correct standards set by the government bodies like the FAA (Herkert, 2020). For example, in the case of new designs for the plane, they can only be implemented after thorough approval from the regulatory experts. Currently, the Company does not permit employees to sign off on jets before delivery following FAA regulations; the sign-off of the jet before delivery is only under authorized supervision from FAA personnel.
Remodel Changes
There have been numerous changes to the Boeing 737 Max. The Company now emphasizes proper engineering procedures in the designs of the plane, and any assumptions are eliminated. The new jet model has corrected the faulty flight control system that was at the core of the crisis in the Company (Johnson, 2020). The current flight control system has eliminated any errors in the plane’s former model. The faulty electoral wiring that was a hazard to employees and passengers has been corrected to ensure the safety of all persons using the new jet. The Company has changed the software; two types of sensors ensure that the plane’s nose does not repeatedly point down (Cruz and de Oliveira, 2020; Herkert, 2020). These two sensors prevent the aerodynamic stalling of the plane, which may create difficulty for the pilots to control the plane. The software also does not override the pilot’s controls like the previous version. The jets have new display systems for the plane crew, with proper electrical wiring from the front to the tail.
Testing and Signing-off of New Aircraft Type
Boeing now employs rigorous testing for the components in the new jet and after full assembly to determine how they function. The testing of the new jet follows the regulations provided by the FAA, which is responsible for ensuring that all plane designs. At Boeing, after assembly, there is a testing period where each component is critically examined to ensure that its functionality is at the highest level. The signing-off of the new jet is no longer done by the Company’s employees but by the authorized personnel from the authorities, unlike in the past (Johnson, 2020).
Human Changes
The Company has several changes in its administration after the crisis involving the two devastating plane crashes. There has been a change in the Company’s executive branch with the firing of its CEO, who signed off on implementing the faulty software (New York Times, 2019). Apart from the executive changes, other departments have seen changes in personnel as individuals resigned from their position and new experts were employed to take their places.
Organization Redesign
After the grounding of its operations due to the faults in the model and software, there has been a redesign. The Company has developed better ways of facilitating employee experience with the new designs; there are new crew procedures and numerous training to ensure that they become familiar with operations. Employee training with simulation equipment ensures that all crew is better positioned to ensure passengers’ safety during travel.
Nature of Lessons learned
Organizations adopt different approaches when they want to bring certain changes to their operations or business. An organization’s actions to correct a problem follow different approaches that ensure that the problem does not occur again in the future (Pauchant et al., 1990; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). In correcting problems, businesses can either decide to correct the problem or decide to examine the original standards; single loop or double loop approaches to correcting problems.
In the single loop approach, the organization focuses on correcting the deviation that results in problems with the set standards that should be followed (Booth 1993; Jacques, 2010). At Boeing, the Company adopts single-loop learning in correcting problems that led to the crisis in 2019. For example, the regulations adopt a single-loop approach to ensure that all people strictly follow the set policies and procedures relating to operations. The changes in employee management also adopt a single loop approach to correct problems and ensure that the training process follows the correct standards established.
The double-loop learning approach does not only look at the deviations and correct them, but it also employs the re-examining of the standard or policy to determine whether it was appropriate in the first place (Hermann, 1963; Billings et al., 1980; Boin and Lagadec, 2000). At Boeing, the Company has adopted the double-loop learning approach in correcting problems in testing and signing off on new types of jets. The original policies allowed company employees to sign off on new jets, which led to assumptions about model and production problems. The Company has adopted a new policy where employees are not allowed to sign off on new jets. Testing and signing-off on new jets are achieved under the supervision of personnel from the FAA.
Purpose of the Change
Organizations adopt new changes in their physical appearance, production line, operations, regulations, organization structure, and human resources by adopting different control measures. At Boeing, the new changes adopted control measures to ensure that its operations aligned with the policies and procedures to prevent problems. Some of the changes in the control measures are preventive, corrective, directive, and defective.
Recommendations
Boeing should adopt a culture of regular analysis of its internal controls used to monitor operations in the organization. Regular analysis of internal control activities and procedures is vital in helping to monitor each of the operations undertaken by the organization in achieving its goals and objectives. Audit analysis of the internal controls presents the Company with an opportunity to identify areas where it should make the necessary adjustment to ensure that all its activities align with the set standards (Perrow, 1999; Reason, 1990). An analysis of the checklists, assumptions made in designs, the root cause for problems, and organization documentation is vital in helping the Company clear what is happening.
Adoption of the Delphi Technique by the Company; outside expert opinion plays an integral part in shaping the actions of organizations. The Delphi Technique is an important tool that an organization can regularly utilize to gather important information on its operations and the changes it has to implement.
Recommendations and Enterprise Risk Management
Several important standards help ensure that the policies and procedures adopted by an organization ensure that it can achieve its goals and objectives. The ISO 3100 provides organizations with a series of standards that ensure that an organization can conduct its operations clearly and precisely. The ISO 3100 of ERM allows the organization to understand better various aspects of managing risks associated with its operation (Chapman, 2011; Merna and Al-Thani, 2011). The standard enhances the objective setting, identification, analysis, evaluation, and treatment of risks in an organization. In addition, it facilitates communication, consultation, monitoring, and feedback on matters relating to risk management.
Implementing the first recommendation of adopting and fostering a culture of regular analysis of internal controls used in the operations of the organization will allow Boeing to identify, analyze and evaluate the risks associated with its operations. ISO 3100 provides an organization with the necessary steps that are important in risk management. An analysis of the internal controls adopted by the Company will ensure that the risk is associated with activities (Smith and Fischbacher, 2009). Internal controls in an organization provide a tool for the management to have control over operations. Hence, regular analysis through auditing will ensure that the companies can identify risks and determine their impact.
In implementing the second recommendation, Boeing will enhance its communication and consultation relating to operations. Unbiased opinion relating to operations is important in helping an organization picture the Company’s risks in the various activities (Topper and Lagadec, 2013). Adopting the Delphi Technique by the Company ensures that the organization can communicate and seek consultation from outside experts who may present a different way of understanding the operations in the organization. Communication and consultation are important in managing the Company’s risks as it provides a different way of examining the risks and how the Company can manage them (Shrivastava et al., 1988; Shrivastava, 2005). By adopting this recommendation, Boeing will be able to enhance its ability to manage risks.
Organizational Resilience
According to Parsons (2010), organization resilience is the capability of an organization to minimize the impact of disruptive events that affect operations. Also, organization resilience can be said to be ‘the organization’s ability to anticipate, prepare for, respond to and adapt to incremental change and sudden disruptions to survive and prosper’ (Stephenson, 2010; Gibson and Tarrant, 2010). Resilient organizations can “bounce back” after undergoing a challenging period in their operations that affect operation. Highly resilient organizations do not suffer immensely due to problems but can use these challenges and problems as a stepping stone to improve their operations to move forward (Smith, 1990; Roux-Dufort and Lalonde, 2013). The characteristics or attributes of resilient organizations are “awareness, agility, flexibility, change readiness, interdependency knowledge, integration, culture and values, leadership and communications” (Parsons, 2010).
There are two types of resilience that organizations exhibit in disruptive events; precursor resilience and recovery resilience. Precursor resilience refers to how an organization is insulated or protected from the impacts of the disruptive event (Smith and Sipika, 1993; Regester and Larkin, 1997; Pearson and Woodman, 2012). Even before the event’s occurrence, the organization has measures that minimize the impacts it feels. Recovery resilience refers to the ability of the organization to quickly recover after a disruptive event occurs (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). Organizations must have the ability to recover from a disruptive event ad continue with their operations.
Boeing employs both precursor and recovery resilience in its operations to help in managing disruptive events. The Company has employed various mechanisms to help prevent disruptive events by continuously conducting inspections on its jet to determine the functionality of the different components. These precursor measures are implemented to prevent a disruptive event (Turner, 1976; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; Hart et al., 2001). Because it is hard to predict the future, the Company also has various recovery resilience measures in an accident. In case of an accident, the Company can examine the event and adopt better ways of preventing the event’s occurrence in the future. By continuously evaluating its internal controls, the Company adapts its strategies to minimize the risks through employing flexible measures.
Conclusion
The ability to deal with risks in the organization ensures that operations continue and the business can achieve its goals and objectives. Risk recognition, assessment, evaluation, and treatment by an organization are essential in ensuring that it is still competitive in its segment. Organization resilience ensures that the Company can minimize the impact of the disruptive event and recover from the situation to continue with its operations. Organizations that have high levels of resilience can utilize the event as a tool for them to expand and grow because they have the resources and are flexible, giving them the ability to adapt to the new changes.
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