On the one hand, the concept of “enlightenment” can be understood as a specific historical era – for example, it is about enlightened absolutism – and on the other, a certain moral, legal, and social program. This possibility of an ambiguous interpretation of the term “enlightenment” determines the originality of hermeneutics aimed at understanding it. It also determines the possible interpretation of the Kantian text – it can be read either as a historical document, or one can see in it an appeal to everyone and all outside of time and space.
Evidently, above all, Kant is trying to understand the very character of his era. He proclaims his age the age of the Enlightenment, which is characterized by the spirit of freedom (Kant 5). He considers the Prussian state to be free since it practices religious tolerance and limits censorship, that is, it recognizes the so-called freedom of conscience. These new trends in the development of society correspond to Kant’s criterion of enlightenment, formulated by him in the text under consideration. This criterion is well known; it presupposes a person’s exit from the state of immaturity, in which he appeared through his own fault (Kant 1). Kant reflects on his time and evaluates it based on his own ideal concept of enlightenment.
In his article, Kant, formulating the concept of the Enlightenment in a new way, clearly and unequivocally points to the objective political conditions, only thanks to which the tasks of the Enlightenment can be achieved. These conditions are civil liberties, and above all, freedom of thought. He is not talking about the fact that people lack reason and, therefore, not about the need to teach them independent thinking, not about pedagogy. Rather, the philosopher is talking about the “lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another,” about “laziness and cowardice” to apply their mind on their own (Kant 1). Thus, Kant argues that our “immaturity,” minority, inability to use our mind, lies in the realm of fear.
In addition to the fact that ‘minors’ by the mind are mentally afraid to get out of care, they are also lazy for this, and people are quickly found who become guardians. Kant is totally not satisfied with this, although this is a fairly natural political line that has not changed to this day and, apparently, is rooted in human nature. Some act as guardians and produce thoughts, while others ‘consume’ these very thoughts and feel much more comfortable at the same time than the guardians themselves. Kant writes that for the overwhelming majority, it is very convenient to be immature. In this case, it is primarily about political determination and political reason, in which Kant sees the potential for the development of society. According to him, education requires only freedom in all cases to publicly use one’s mind (Kant 2).
From the very first paragraph, he makes it clear that a person is himself responsible for his or her state of immaturity. It is necessary to understand that it is possible to get out of it only through those changes that a person makes over himself. Thus, the Enlightenment should be regarded both as a process in which people act collectively and as an act of courage to be performed personally. Kant calls for the liberation of the individual through the acquisition of knowledge, emancipation from any external influence. It can be said that Kant understands enlightenment as a period of maturation of humanity, associated with the rejection of blindly following the tradition of the past.
Explaining his understanding of public freedom of thought, freedom of criticism, Kant distinguishes it from private freedom of thought, which can and should be limited when it comes to the performance, for example, of official duty by an official or a priest. However, the same priest, if he acts as a theologian-researcher, has the right to count on complete freedom of expression. The reason is by nature free and, therefore, accepts no orders to consider anything to be true. It, in fact, should be considered the ability to judge autonomously, that is, freely, in accordance only with the rules of thinking. The main thing in Kant’s understanding of the freedom of public use of reason is the freedom to criticize the social status quo. Public freedom of reason, in Kant’s conviction, prevents revolutionary outbursts, since this freedom in the best way promotes progress, transforming consciousness and deeds, and thus possible real improvement of the conditions of people’s life.
Opposing the Enlightenment to the revolution, Kant, however, is very far from condemning the victorious revolutions that have already taken place in European history. He condemns the attempts of the counter-revolutionaries to restore the old regime. Moreover, Kant argues that if the people succeeded in the uprising, the sovereign should return to the position of a subject and not raise an uprising to return power. This means that the conflict between revolution and law is overcome thanks to the victory of the revolution, and now not the revolution decreeing new norms of law that is in conflict with the law, but counter-revolution. This formulation of the question of revolution deepens the views characteristic of the enlighteners since it recognizes the conflict between the revolution and the existing legal institutions as fundamentally solvable. Thus, in his essay, Kant proposes an evolutionary path of development of society, the basis of which is primarily the restructuring of social consciousness. The revolution must take place in the mind – here mainly the criticism of the Great French Revolution is seen.