Water-related terrorism is one of the most sophisticated and violent methods of damaging society. Although the effects of those terrorist acts might seem less violent than the “traditional” armed attacks, they are actually highly detrimental to economics and population health. Often, water-related terrorism includes damaging government facilities, and since water resources are vital for human existence, it is relatively profitable for terrorists to attack them and cause mass destruction.
The acts of water-related terrorism are divided into two types: ones targeted at wastewater treatment facilities and others targeted at drinking water resources. Regarding the first type, there is a risk of substantial environmental danger if terrorist groups explode underground collector sewers, causing roads, dams, and river banks to collapse (Copeland & Cody, 2010). The attacks on drinking water facilities mainly imply releasing toxic chemicals, which can be highly dangerous and, sometimes, lethal for people.
This prospect, of course, has become a major concern for the government, so it changed its focus from natural disasters and vandalism to broader malevolent threats from terrorists (Copeland & Cody, 2010). The cautiousness is justified because the number of water terrorism incidents per year has increased about four times after September 11, 2001 (Veilleux & Dinar, 2019, pp. 7-8). With this in mind, it is essential to examine how the infrastructure is prepared for possible attacks.
There is a number of weaknesses in the water supply system that make it relatively fragile. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, as described in Copeland and Cody’s (2010) paper, the water supply infrastructure in the United States was rather vulnerable due to it being technically unprepared and unable to assess the risks properly. According to Veilleux and Dinar (2019), the majority of incidents targeted water infrastructure facilities for two possible reasons: whether to send a message to the government or because these constructions were the easiest to assess. Copeland and Cody (2010) also describe that the standard strategy for terrorists was filling pipelines with explosive substances through maintenance holes.
This information shows that the control over the water supply system used to be low because virtually anyone could approach a water supply facility and damage it. Today, twenty years later, dams, basins, and boilers are secured with guards, barriers, and outdoor cameras, but the sewage system remains the largest weak spot. Overall, the water supply infrastructure’s most significant vulnerability is it is fragmented and extended, which makes every single facility, including every maintenance hole or water tower, easily accessible to terrorists.
Another significant issue I did not describe in this post is the low awareness of the population about the dangers of water-related terrorism. Since many attacks are still targeted at drinking water, a large part of the population is at a huge risk. I have already mentioned the potential of toxic chemicals being released into drinking water. However, the ruse in such plans is that the chemicals are often stored at water distribution facilities and used for disinfection, which makes the possibility of their release even higher.
Many water supply systems and other utilities already consider strengthening their risk management requirements, but the people of our country still cannot protect themselves from such events. With that in mind, the question I address to my classmates is, “What can be done to raise awareness about water-related terrorism and protect individuals or households from possible health damage?” I am genuinely concerned about this issue and want it to be discussed.
References
Copeland, C., & Cody, B. (2010). Terrorism and security issues facing the water infrastructure sector. The Library of Congress.
Veilleux, J., & Dinar., S. (2019). A global analysis of water-related terrorism, 1970–2016, Terrorism and Political Violence, 1-26. Web.