Summary
Don Marquis is an author of an essay that argues that abortions are immoral from a non-religious standpoint. He begins with a general discussion on why killing is wrong. According to Marquis, killing any human being is morally wrong not because it inflicts suffering on their loved ones but deprives the victim itself of future experiences, activities, and other benefits of living. Next, he asserts that despite much controversy on the subject, a fetus is entitled to the application of the same logic (Marquis). He explains that since a fetus will eventually, if not obstructed, naturally develop into a human being, then killing it deprives this person of a life (Marquis). He contrasts fetuses to sperm, implying that sperm will not, by itself, become a person, therefore marking abortions as immoral and contraception as not.
Evaluation
I disagree with the Marquis’s explanation of the immorality of killing and his stance on abortions. From Marquis’s view on deprivation of experiences in case of death, it can be considered that he believes that existing is ultimately better than not existing. However, it is not a universal opinion; the value of existence cannot be measured according to noncomparativistic theory (Nebel 126). Marquis defends people’s right to euthanasia but fails to apply the same logic to mere existence, which also may be filled with suffering. Instead, killing is immoral because it violates a person’s autonomy. In this case, abortion is a confrontation of women’s and fetuses’ rights to bodily autonomy. Since carrying and giving birth to a child requires women to donate their bodies and possibly bear life-long consequences, forced pregnancy violates their freedom and independence. An unborn fetus, incapable of maintaining a life outside of the womb, is not entitled to another person’s body without their consent, similarly to the bodily integrity right regulating organ donations.
Works Cited
Marquis, Don. “Why Abortion is Immoral.” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86, 1989.
Nebel, Jacob M. “Asymmetries in the Value of Existence.” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 33, no.1, 2019.