The Colgan air disaster that involved Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ aircraft is linked to loss of control on approach. The plane carried a total of 49 individuals including four crew members. Flight 3407 was operating as a continental connection managed by a captain and first officer. The incident occurred when the aircraft was approaching the Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo New York. Based on the report provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the incident was caused by the failure of the pilot and co-pilot to respond to the stall warnings accordingly. The twin-engine plane departed from Liberty International Airport (EWR) heading to Buffalo where it crushed a residential area killing one person on the ground. The overall estimated route time for flight 3407 was about 53 minutes. During the mid-air flight, the crew members kept communicating with the tower controller for landing clearance. The captain and the first officer received training on how to deal with different situations they might face in the process. However, following the recordings from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), the breakdown in multi-crew cooperation made flight 3407 crushed.
Both the captain and first officer of flight 3407 received training on takeoffs, maneuvers, and landing controls. However, during these periods, the crew members used different aircraft having varied features such as the Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ. In the event of a stall, the pilot and co-pilot would react and respond differently to correct the situation following the training they received (Schmidt et al., 2021). For instance, the first officer’s training on approach-to-stall recoveries before securing employment with Colgan Air Company was completely different from those offered by the Q400 (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010). The inconsistencies pose a significant challenge in managing such an eventful situation faced by the co-pilot.
Generally, pilots undertake multi-crew training before being certified to operate as two or more pilots in the cockpit. The practice is to ensure both the individuals can manage human factors and other varied conditions during the flight. In the case of flight 3407, the two crew members underwent the program which qualified them to manage the plane. However, based on the approach to-stall pieces of training, the crew had different recovery approaches that made it difficult for them to enact the right measure to overcome the warnings. For instance, the captain failed to effectively monitor the airspeed based on the low-speed cue for the landing approach (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010). The flight data recorder (FDR) recorded the airspeed to be 180 knots when the plane was cruising at an altitude of about 2300 feet (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010). According to the information gathered from the FDR, the pilots’ actions to correct the stall warnings varied which made it difficult to manage the situation.
Similarly, the engagement of the pilot and co-pilot in unrelated flight conversations during the landing approach contributed to the multi-crew breakdown. It is necessary for crews to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures to ensure they remain focused and attentive to changes in their environment. This was not the case during the fateful event that occurred. The crewS were involved in a conversation during the critical time which made it difficult for both to monitor the changes in airspeed and perform the required landing checklist effectively. The aspect led to a significant loss of focus among the pilots sabotaging their flight operations.
In addition, the inability of the crew members to select the right airspeed in icing conditions played a significant role in causing the accident. Following the conversation both the pilot and co-pilot had based on the FDR information, the crew observed more ice present on the plane (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010). Despite the condition, none of them took the right action to ensure the icing condition was reduced. Instead focused on their personal conversation apart from the flight-related duties. The CVR did not detect any movement or attempts by any of the crew members to observe the ice sensor to determine the situation.
In order to avoid such a fateful event in the future, the Federation Aviation Administration (FAA) must ensure the aspect of multi-crew cooperation is addressed effectively. For instance, both the pilot and co-pilot should have relevant and similar training on how to deal with approach-to-stall recoveries. Since most of the crew members train with different aircraft, upon employment by a given airline company, they have to be subjected to initial training encompassing managing possible stall warnings. The practices can be performed on the actual plane having common features or on a simulated platform to enable crews to have the same idea on handling the situations.
Another effective approach to preventing a breakdown in multi-crew cooperation is monitoring close the conversation and other activities they engage in during the flight period. For example, the cockpit should have a system that allows the control towers to listen and follows the dialogue between the pilots. This will allow the ground crew to remind the captain to focus on the flight-related discussion if possible to enhance their concertation.
Similarly, the crews should ensure they are familiar with the aircraft’s avionics. To achieve this, both captain and the first officer must conduct preflight planning, interact with the systems of the plane and advance their rudder skills. Such an approach will enable the pilots to improve their situational awareness which is essential for improving multi-crew cooperation (Endsley, 2021). When the individuals become comfortable with the aircraft, it will be easier for them to detect and recover possible stalls they might encounter during the flight. Situational awareness will allow the crew to remain proactive when making decisions based on the conditions they are facing.
Moreover, each of the pilots should adopt the tendency of cross-checking the actions of one another. The approach is essential because it enables the crew members to detect possible errors committed by the other which can cause a fatal accident. Failure to keep monitoring the actions of each pilot can lead to the inability to detect unsafe commands that might break the events. Therefore, it is necessary for the captain and co-pilot to effectively keep following acts of one another during flight hours.
Generally, aviation safety is dependent on the crew’s actions during the flight. Based on the report, the breakdown of multi-crew cooperation facilitated the occurrence of the Colgan Air crash. It is, therefore, necessary for the airline organizations and FAA to ensure captains and their first officers receive adequate training to handle possible stalls using a similar plane or simulated platform. Subjecting pilots to such conditions will enhance their familiarity with the avionic system. Moreover, the industry must ensure the crew members have a high level of situational awareness. The ability is essential in allowing the pilots to react and respond effectively to the information they receive mid-air. In addition, the pilot and co-pilot should adopt the cross-checking approach to enable them to oversee the actions of each other to enhance error detection. When the crew engages in such practice, it will be easier to prevent acts that might lead to plane crash.
References
Endsley, M. R. (2021). Situation awareness. Handbook of human factors and ergonomics, 434-455.
Schmidt, T. A., Kourdali, H. K., & Nixon, J. (2021). Evaluating process-based and crew-centred approaches to procedure design in aviation: Workload and performance changes in go-around manoeuvres. Applied Ergonomics, 90, 103244.
National Transportation Safety Board. (2010). Loss of control on approach, Colgan Air, Inc., operating as continental connection flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, Clarence Center, New York, February 12, 2009. NTSB/AAR-10/01. Washington, DC. Web.