Omer Bartov is a distinguished professor of history whose works on various books are appreciated globally. He has written many articles and books, the most popular being his extensive studies concerning the German Nazi Army atrocities committed in World War II. In this regard, his opinion is mainly based on the idea that the German Army was politically instigated and was entirely responsible for the crimes against humanity that occurred during World War II, including the Jewish Holocaust that almost wiped out the entire Jewish population that resided in Germany, sparing only a few survivors who either went to exile in the neighboring states or were hidden from the soldiers by hospitable friends or neighbors (Bartov 111). In addition, he stated that Wehrmacht was an institution of the German Nazis that was the epicenter of the atrocities that contributed to the Jewish Holocaust conducted in the areas within the Soviet Union. Bartov is among the best historians regarding the disciplines of war and genocide. This essay will address the different ideologies of Bartov, which contrast with other opposing opinions by other scholars.
Few scholars would dispute Omer Bartov’s thesis that warfare and atrocity were inextricably linked in the twentieth century. Despite this, the ancient HistoryHistory of the Second World War and the tale of the Holocaust interact directly far too rarely (Bartov 112). Even the influential, multi-volume source, Germany in World War 2, barely discusses the Holocaust. In Germany’s War and the destruction, Bartov’s principal goal was to demonstrate why German history should oppose the segregation of these two tales.
In the East, Hitler waged war based on race and it was meant to support the German military machine for a short while at the risk of reducing the enslaved persons to death. In the long run, the Nazis hoped to forge a solid German empire and “land” enormous swaths of territory, forcing millions of people to “vanish” through forceful expulsion and mass killing (Bartov 113). According to some historians, the exhilaration of success in the initial stages of the war against Russia led Nazi authorities to commence the massive slaughter of European Jews. And besides, this was a philosophical and ethnic struggle to extinguish “Jewish Bolshevism” in their views.
Some scholars believe that the shift to extermination resulted from anger with Blitzkrieg’s inability to reach its objectives in Russia. If the Germans could not beat the Soviets right away, the Nazis could at least conclude the battle against the Jews in Auschwitz’s extermination cells (Bartov 114). Although there is no agreement on the form of the link between the resolution on mass killings and the trajectory of the Bombing in Russia, there is virtually full agreement on the link between both the Bombing and the execution of extermination.
After 1945, how will Nazis deal with the memories of this racial extermination battle? They did not according to Bartov, until lately. Rather, postwar Germans were preoccupied with two conflicting representations of Hitler’s war: the initial excitement, when the enchanting strategy of Bombing conveyed magnificent, cheap German successes in rapid succession, as well as the ultimate death anxieties of the Red Army, when hardened, skeptical, but dedicated German soldiers battled valiantly but woefully against the extreme force of the Allied forces’ advanced material wealth (Bartov 112). This second picture has enabled Germans to see themselves as the victimized while ignoring the plight of the actual victims: “Jews, as well as all other Russian people belonging to “natural” and “political” groups, deemed unfit for existence by the Soviet government.
Many scholars in Germany who’ve already spent their lives investigating about Holocaust’s historical background have found it challenging to understand the victims. They have continued to view this period with a functionalist conceptual approach, which minimizes the relevance of ideological and ethical choices. The survivors’ pain and the impact of antisemitism are acknowledged from a functionalist perspective. They believe, however, that neither the examination of the assailants’ beliefs nor the examination of the victims’ experiences can explain why the genocide occurred (Bartov 112). Instead, functionalist theorists look at structural reasons in the Nazi “polycratic regime” that led to an “accumulated radicalism” that culminated in extermination.
Bartov highlights the efforts of Goetz Aly, a younger German historian, to reintroduce flesh-and-blood criminals into the narrative by probing their motives and thoughts. The genocide is placed within a broader context of Nazi demographic policy, including the “Master Plan for the East,” in Aly’s work. A team of specialists, economists, and historians created specific plans for the statistical reorganization of Poland and conquered Eastern Europe, making these countries more commercially effective and profitable to the German occupiers (Bartov 115). Millions of Slavic people and Jews were deported and murdered as part of this scheme. The issue for Bartov is that in Aly’s depiction of Nazi “racial policies,” racism does not play a significant part. However, if antisemitism is put to the periphery of the discussion, it is impossible to comprehend why Nazi strategists felt it was imperative to exterminate the Jews.
Antisemitism is conspicuously missing from Wolfgang Sofsky’s groundbreaking analysis of the prison camp structure, The Rule of Torture, according to Bartov. Sofsky portrays a terrifying image of prison camps as places where “dictatorship” was built and exercised. On the other hand, the Ultimate Solution did not merely evolve from the prison camp scheme that the Nazis had constructed before the conflict’s onset (Bartov 117). Daniel Goldhagen’s research, Hitler’s Committed Assassins, put antisemitism again into consideration the German offenders’ motives. Goldhagen’s monocausal emphasis on the force of the “process of differentiation antisemitism” and his conscious choice not to concentrate on the killing centers are challenged by Bartov.
The final chapter of Bartov’s book begins with a lyrical discussion of the moment of HistoryHistory in which we find ourselves. Eventually, the last living Genocide survivors will die, leaving us “alone, peering into the gloom of the old days with nothing to direct us to save the textual and pictorial traces left by others who are there.” The importance of Victor Klemperer’s hidden journal, compiled in Germany in 1995 and rapidly translated into English, is highlighted by this potential (Bartov 117). Klemperer was just a Great author rescued from the extermination camps by marrying a non-Jewish German woman. He declined to embrace the identification of a non-German that the dictatorship and a growing number of his contemporaries were attempting to impose on him.
When his journals were first compiled in Germany, critics praised Klemperer’s unwavering commitment to his German identity and deemed attractive his assertion that perhaps the Nazis weren’t Germans. “That’s what Klemperer came to tell Germans today: that perhaps the Jews became Germans, probably the best Germans, maybe even the only Germans, but then they were the individuals who were not Nazis,” Bartov adds, implying that the journals could lead German people to a sensible conclusion. For professionals in this sector, what Bartov has had to express in his work will come as no surprise. On the other hand, experts are unlikely to be the intended audience (Bartov 116). I would gladly suggest this type of book to undergrads or peers who wish to stay current on the most pressing issues and debates in this vast and constantly growing field of study.
Bartov’s views have always been compelling and occasionally genius. His prose is exquisite. He never loses sight of the moral consequences of the scholarly debates he deftly dissects. Finally, he points out how Germans have regarded the Genocide and Hitler’s warfare since 1945 as having a significant impact on their nationhood (Bartov 116) He could have mentioned East Germany further, which tried to deal with the Nazi past uniquely, at least on paper. However, this is only one flaw in otherwise fascinating work.
The opponents of Bartovs include Andreas Hillgruber. He insisted that there was no moral difference between the war on the Eastern front and the Genocide by German allies. He has also found it challenging to understand the victims of the war, just like the other historians. Bartovs has argued with these opponents who think that the genocide did not impact the people (Bartov 117). The experts have continued to view this period with a functionalist conceptual approach, which minimizes the relevance of ideological and ethical choices. The survivors’ pain and the impact of antisemitism are acknowledged from a functionalist perspective. They believe, however, that neither the examination of the assailants’ beliefs nor the examination of the victims’ experiences can explain why the genocide occurred. Instead, functionalist theorists look at structural reasons in the Nazi “polycratic regime” that led to an “accumulated radicalism” that culminated in extermination.
According to Bartov, antisemitism is noticeably absent from Wolfgang Sofsky’s seminal study of the prison camp organization, The Rule of Torture. Sofsky paints a dreadful picture of prison camps as locations where “dictatorship” was established and enforced. On the other hand, the Ultimate Solution did not simply develop out of the Nazis’ pre-war prison camp program (Bartov 115). Hitler’s Committed Assassins, a study by Daniel Goldhagen, reintroduces antisemitism into discussing the German criminals’ motivations. Bartov challenges Goldhagen’s monocausal emphasis on the force of the “process of differentiating antisemitism” and his purposeful decision not to focus on the killing centers.
In conclusion, Bartov highlights the efforts of Goetz Aly, a younger German historian, to reintroduce flesh-and-blood criminals into the narrative by probing their motives and thoughts. The genocide is placed within a broader context of Nazi demographic policy, including the “Master Plan for the East,” in Aly’s work. A team of specialists, economists, and historians—created specific plans for the statistical reorganization of Poland and conquered Eastern Europe, making these countries more commercially effective and profitable to the German occupiers. Some scholars believe that the shift to extermination resulted from anger with Blitzkrieg’s inability to reach its objectives in Russia. “Although there is no agreement on the form of the link between the resolution on mass killings and the trajectory of the Bombing in Russia,” Bartov adds, “there is virtually complete agreement on the link between both the Bombing and the execution of extermination. If the Germans could not beat the Soviets right away, the Nazis could at least conclude the battle against the Jews in Auschwitz’s extermination cells.
Work Cited
Bartov, Omer. “The Truth and Nothing But:” New Directions in the History of the Jews in the Polish Lands, 2018, pp. 111-118.