Introduction
Security in the aviation industry has remained a sensitive issue that stakeholders are often keen to enforce. According to Bruey (2018), major milestones have been made to eliminate any form of threat to the airplanes and airports around the world. Although regarded as the safest means of transport, incidences have been reported globally that led to death and injuries of passengers. Campion, López, and Payen (2019) explain that some of them are caused by human factors and poorly-maintained highways while others are as a result of technological failures, weather conditions, or unfavorable terrains. The unique approach that is always taken in investigating every accident and incident has made the air travel one of the safest ways of moving from one place to another. Some of these accidents and incidents often have varying impacts on defining changes that are introduced in the sector to improve the safety of passengers, passenger crew, the airport, and planes. The Germanwings flight 9525 of March 24, 2015, is one such incident that has remained pivotal in the history of the aviation security. In this paper, the focus is to critically analyze the accident, focusing on its causes and the impact it has had on aviation security.
Analysis of the Incident Pivotal in the History of Aviation Security
The Germanwings Flight 9525 was one of the most tragic but easily avoidable accidents in French aviation history. The scheduled international passenger flight left Barcelona-El Prat Airport and was destined to Dusseldorf Airport in Germany (Bor et al. 2017). On board were 144 passengers and six members of the crew. The aircraft, Airbus A320-211 was well-maintained and had not registered any major mechanical failures prior to the accident. Patrick Sondenheimer, a 34-year old pilot, was the captain, while Andreas Lubitz who was 27 years old was the co-pilot. The two pilots had sufficient experience flying Airbus A320-211 and they had used the Barcelona-Dusseldorf route several times and understood it well.
The plane left Barcelona at about 9:35 CET and by 10:30 CET, it responded to instructions given by the French air traffic control (Chittum 2017). Analysis of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) shows that it was after communicating with the air traffic controllers in France that the captain left the cockpit, leaving the co-pilot in control. The data shows that soon after the captain left, the first officer locked himself inside the cockpit and initiated a controlled decent. The investigators were able to establish that Andreas had practiced the controlled decent before, and he did so when the pilot left the cockpit. In the previous attempts, he did not lock the cockpit and regained altitude without causing suspicion. During the flight 9525, he denied the captain access to the cockpit. As the plane continued with its decent towards the French Alps, the captain tried using every means possible to gain entry into the cockpit after it became apparent that the first officer was not responding to his pleas. As Chittum (2018) observes, the cockpit doors had been reinforced following the September 11, 2001 terrorists’ attack and it was impossible for the pilot to breach them. The fate of the plane was sealed and it soon crushed into the mountainside, killing all the 150 people on board.
Human Factors and Socio-Technical System Relevant to the Accident
The incident became pivotal in the aviation history security as reminded stakeholders of the dangers that human factors may have in the sector. Kuşhan (2018) observes that the incident would have been avoided had the stakeholders in this sector taken seriously the Mozambican Airline flight TM470 on November 29, 2013, less than two years prior to this accident. The cause was the same, but the fact that it happened in Africa and the death toll was 33 people, it was easy to ignore, hence it had little impact on defining the security in the aviation sector. The Germanwings Flight 9525 had an identical pattern to the previous accident, with the main difference being that the fatality was almost five times that of flight TM470 and that it happened in Europe.
The investigation revealed that this accident was primarily caused by a human factor. The engines were in perfect conditions and the pilot had full control of the aircraft. When the pilot left the cockpit, the second officer deliberately initiated controlled decent as he headed to the mountains. The co-pilot increased airspeed and then remained unresponsive in his seat (Ziomek 2018). He ignored all the warnings and failed to respond to radio calls from the French air traffic controllers. It was revealed that the co-pilot intentionally crushed the plane into the mountains, killing everyone on board the plane. It was unfortunate that during the last few seconds before the crush, all the passengers and other crew members had realized that they were going to die as screams were heard in the cockpit voice recorder.
When the investigators conducted a detailed analysis of the co-pilot’s profile, it emerged that he had been a relatively good pilot and was trusted by the company. However, a further analysis revealed that the pilot had been seeing a doctor. According to Huntley (2020), Andreas’ severe episodes of depression started in 2008 when he was still in his pilot training college. He had to temporarily stop the training, but was able to resume classes in 2009 when his psychiatrist confirmed that the depression was resolved (Hargens et al. 2017). In 2014, he got his commercial pilot’s license and was immediately hired by the Germanwings as one of their first officers. A search that was conducted at his house enabled the investigators to have access to his most recent medical records. It was established that Andreas had been seeing a psychiatrists for severe episodes of depression (Finger and Button 2017). It was revealed that he had suicidal tendencies and the doctor had given him clear instructions that he was unfit to fly a plane. He had been instructed to take a sick leave and given tablets to help manage his condition. He was expected to take the sick note to the employer so that he would be granted the leave.
Doctor-patient confidentiality is a concept that is highly upheld in Europe, as Chittum (2017) observes. In fact, a patient can sue a doctor who reveals their medical condition to third parties without their consent. Other than the fine that a doctor may be forced to pay, they may lose their work permit. The strict ethics and regulations made it almost impossible for the doctor to share the critical information with the management of Germanwings. The psychiatrist hoped that the patient would follow guidelines provided, and report the nature of his condition to the employer. However, that was not the case as Andreas hid his medical report from the employer. As the condition worsened, no one at the company realized that the he was increasingly becoming suicidal (Albers et al. 2017). In the first leg of the flight from Germany to Spain, the two pilots had positive and respectful conversations which the investigators believed calmed him. On this fateful flight back to Germany, there was a slight exchange between them, and it is believed it was the trigger that prompted him to make the decision to crash the plane and kill everyone on board.
The investigators revealed that although the accident was primarily caused by human factors, technical systems also failed at a time they were needed the most. When aircraft manufacturers responded to the September 11, 2001 terror attack in the United States that involved hijacking of planes, one of the main changes introduced was the reinforcement of cockpit doors to make it impossible for people to force their way into the cockpit. However, these experts did not anticipate a situation where one of the two pilots would become the source of threat. There was no mechanism introduced that would enable a pilot to legitimately get back to the cockpit. Even after the warning systems went off, indicating that the person in the cockpit was not doing enough to rescue the plane, the system failed to allow the pilot back to the cockpit. Finger and Button (2017) believe that a system should have existed that would sense the malicious goal of a pilot who is intentionally making an effort to crash a plane while locking out the other pilot. The codes that the pilot used failed to be of any help in the final seconds before the accident.
Changes Instigated After the Event
The Germanwings flight 9525 revealed major weaknesses in the aviation sector that have to be addressed to avoid similar events from taking place in the future. For a long time, there was a general assumption that cases of suicide were extremely rare in the aviation sector. As such, emphasis was placed on protecting pilots from attacks by criminals who may board planes as innocent passengers (Bor et al. 2017). However, it became clear that it was equally important to protect passengers from pilots who may be having mental problems that may lead to suicidal tendencies. This particular accident was an awakening call to the aviation industry primarily because of the nature and number of those who lost their lives. It was a major reminder that some major changes were needed to enhance safety. In this section, it is important to discuss the major changes directly attributed to this accident.
Human Factor Measures and Methods
The accident made it necessary for stakeholders in the aviation sector to take various human factor measures meant to protect passengers. The primary recommendation that was made following this accident was that at no point should the cockpit of a commercial plane be with only one person. In large commercial planes, it is now a requirement that there should be at least three pilots and an engineer within the cockpit. At any time, there should always be two pilots responsible for the flight. In smaller commercial planes where it may not be economical to have three pilots, it is a requirement that before any of the two pilots can leave the cockpit, one of the flight crew members must replace them for the entire duration when they are out.
In their report, the investigators stated that if there was another person in the cockpit, the outcome would have been different. First, the person would have talked the pilot out of the suicide mission. Chittum (2018) explains that when one is under immense stress and is considering taking their own lives, talk therapy can be the best solution to managing their condition, as explained in the stress theory. If they co-pilot had someone to talk to in a calm way, he would have reconsidered his decision to crash the plane. Yelling of the pilot who was trying every method to get back to the cockpit only strengthened his resolve to crash the plane. It created panic as he might have feared an attack if he opened the door. He might have also felt that if the accident was averted, he would go to prison, besides losing the job. As such, the best alternative to him was to proceed with the suicide-murder mission as the theory warns.
The team also explained that having two people in the cockpit at every stage of the journey would have helped the situation by creating fear. The co-pilot would not have had the opportunity to enter the inputs meant to crash the plane if one was there to observe his actions. As Huntley (2020) explains, most of those who commit crime, including in cases of murder-suicide, often try to avoid being seen. The lack of opportunity to commit this crime would have protected passengers and crew members in this flight. In an extreme case where one decides to down the plane even in the presence of another person in the cockpit, it is possible for the other pilot to take control of the plane and invite others into the cockpit to help subdue the one trying to kill everyone. These measures were meant to ensure that a mentally troubled pilot cannot single-handedly bring down a commercial plane.
Socio-technical System
The report also made some recommendations focusing on social and technical issues relevant to the aviation sector. One of them was that it is crucial for airlines to conduct regular counseling to their crew members to address mental health issues. Finger and Button (2017) emphasized the need to address both personal and professional issues that one faces. Personal issues should not be ignored because they directly affect professional decisions that one makes. The accident also brought up a debate about the concept of doctor-patient confidentiality. It was clear that if the psychiatrist had shared the finding with the management of Germanwings, the accident would have been averted. A section of the community now demands that such sensitive information should not be withheld from relevant authorities.
Conclusion
The Germanwings flight 9525 was a pivotal incident in the history of the aviation security. Andreas Lubitz, a 27-years-old co-pilot in this flight, deliberately locked the captain out of the cockpit, initiated a controlled decent, and crushed the plane onto the French Alps, killing everyone on board. Before the accident, measures were put in place to protect pilots in a cockpit. It emerged that it was equally essential to protect passengers from rogue and mentally tormented pilots. A major change was introduced in the aviation sector. In this regulation, it is now required that at no one point in the entire flight of a commercial plane should one pilot remain in the cockpit. There has to be at least two crew members (with at least one pilot) in the cockpit at all times.
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