Introduction
Operation Anaconda was a military operation conducted by the international coalition led by the United States against the forces of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in March of 2002. It was a part of the war in Afghanistan that took place from 2001 to 2021 and was initiated by the 11th of September attacks. This operation is one of the most significant and well-known operations of the global war on terrorism. It was proclaimed a success; however, this statement was not met with a resounding agreement in the public and military realms.
After the fall of Kabul and the fortified Tora Bora complex in November, October, and December of 2001, certain al-Qaeda militants retreated to the Gardez area in southeastern Afghanistan. American intelligence data in early 2002 showed that the militants were regrouping in the Shah-i-Kot valley and preparing for active hostilities (Proctor, 2020). The US command decided to launch a preemptive strike and destroy the enemy group before it resumed activity.
Operation Anaconda was conducted from the 2nd to the 18th of March 2002. The original plan provided for the implementation of the classic hammer and anvil tactic. The point of this tactic was to have Afghan forces loyal to the United States enter the valley and two American battalions to block all exits from it. Such employment of the troops would ensure the encirclement of the enemy (Proctor, 2020). Furthermore, the operation had the support of troops from allied nations, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and France.
At the planning stage of the operation, serious miscalculations were made. Lacking adequate intelligence, the American command in Afghanistan supposed that the enemy would not offer serious resistance and that the operation would be completed efficiently and quickly. However, the al-Qaeda militants were ready to defend themselves. The primary reasons for complications lay in the absence of artillery support and the convoluted chain of command between the Air Forces, the Army, and the Afghan troops (Proctor, 2020). The plan was disrupted on the first day of the operation, and the American commanders were forced to improvise on the spot.
The Takur Ghar Battle
The most famous event of operation Anaconda was the battle on the Takur Ghar Ridge (also known as Roberts Ridge) on the 4th of March. Due to the lack of coordination of their actions, American special forces units were ambushed three times a day at the height of Takur Ghar. As a result, two heavy transport helicopters, MH-47E, were damaged and the third was destroyed.
The time factor severely complicated this part of the operation. It was necessary to reach the peak of the mountain (Takur Ghar) before daylight, so the time period for surveillance was cut significantly. The battle was the deadliest interaction during the Anaconda operation, with seven troops killed and twelve wounded. The wounded soldiers were not allowed medical evacuation during the daylight in order to avoid the loss of another aircraft.
Later, using additional aviation crafts, which played a very significant role in the operation, the coalition forces managed to enter the Shah-i-Kot valley and comb it. By this time, most of the al-Qaeda fighters had either died or left the valley safely. The capture or elimination of al-Qaida and Taliban leaders was one of the most important directives of the operation. However, the disorganized nature of the operation allowed the majority of them to escape to Pakistan during the ongoing combat (Proctor, 2020). The results of operation Anaconda battles had serious impacts on the future military ordeals.
The Role of the Aviation Forces
Despite the lack of communication between the ground and aircraft troops, the air forces managed to play a significant role in the operation. One of the most important advantages that aircrafts can provide to military combat is intelligence gathering. However, as it was exemplified by the Anaconda events, air crafts are not as efficient at obtaining detailed data as ground personnel. Before the launch of the offense, air forces spent weeks to reconnaissance the area and identify eligible landing spots. However, after investigating the results, the command realized that they would have to rely mostly on human-provided intelligence (Farkas, 2018). This fact was an unfortunate one since on-ground research proves to be more difficult and leaves the personnel more vulnerable.
The more direct involvement of aircrafts in the operation came in the form of patrolling. The goal of air patrols was to charge air power at the enemy troops during both day and night time. As a result, a considerable number of al-Qaida troops and equipment have been eliminated, wounded, or damaged. In addition, the patrols were able to support the ground troops that were fighting in the valley from the air (McDaniel, 2020). Therefore, despite the rhetoric of negligence in the air force aspect of the operation, the air troops’ contribution cannot be disregarded.
Results
The US command declared operation Anaconda a major success for the coalition, but this statement was ambiguously perceived in army circles. Following the results of the Anaconda, a lively discussion unfolded about why due attention was not paid to the aviation component of the coalition forces at the planning stage. This lack of preparation has led to great difficulties in the interaction of ground units with strike aircraft (Proctor, 2020). The experience of this operation led to an improvement in the mechanisms of interaction between the US Air Force and the US Army.
The losses of the US forces in the operation amounted to 8 people killed and approximately 80 wounded. The coalition forces suffered losses as well, which included seven troops. All the dead were soldiers of special forces units; seven of the eight were killed in the battle at Takur-Gar. The losses of al-Qaeda forces are unknown; according to various sources, they ranged from 100 to 1,000 people killed (Proctor, 2020). The battle in the Shah-i-kot valley remains the largest battle involving US ground forces in Afghanistan.
The operation was a success in terms of joined cooperation experience and learning. The commanding tactics employed during combat showed the necessity of joined operation training. It has been established that the troops require united mission orders, fire restrictions, and rules of engagement. Furthermore, the cooperation among troops of various nations and backgrounds showed that joined operations have a solid potential of being utmost efficient and prolific.
Conclusion
In conclusion, operation Anaconda was a military ordeal that has had a polarizing effect in the military sphere. It showcased the strengths and weaknesses in joined operations and highlighted the need for further joined training. Despite being able to clear the area in question, the operation did not fully succeed in its mission. The disruption in the plan came from inadequate preparations, which created a precedent for apt surveillance and intelligence gathering importance.
References
Farkas, S. (2018). Airpower in counterinsurgency. Honvédségi Szemle–Hungarian Defense Review, 146(1), 175–183.
McDaniel, D. (2020). Australia’s intervention in Afghanistan, 2001–02. In J. Blaxland, M. Fielding, & T. Gellerfy (Eds.), Niche wars: Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001–2014 (pp. 65–79). ANU Press.
Proctor, P. (2020). Lessons unlearned: The US army’s role in creating the forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. University of Missouri Press.