The Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26, 2008, is one of the most despicable and heinous acts the world has ever seen. Consequently, the attack impacted to massive loss of life as a staggering number of approximately 200 people dying and other 300 more succumbing to injuries (Outlook Web Bureau, 2022). The gun-wielding perpetrators entered India via a boat from Karachi. Their main aim was to attack prominent places with a high number of people; for instance, Cama Hospital, Nariman House business, Chhatrapati Shivaji railway station complex, Leopold Cafe, the Oberoi-Trident Hotel, and Taj Hotels.
The horrific attack is arguably perceived to have arisen due to several speculations. First, reports sufficed that it was a part of a long-standing campaign of covert warfare waged by the ISI through ‘non-state’ spies. Second, specific ISI officers and the leadership of Lashkar-e-Taiba were implicated in the 2008 attack (Outlook Web Bureau, 2022). Finally, the last school thought believed that historical record refutes the claim that it was solely the activity of a non-state actor. However, conclusive evidence linked the attack to Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Jihadist terrorist group hailing from Pakistan, characterized by automatic guns and hand grenades. In the wake of the Mumbai assault, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a sizeable jihadist organization located in
|Pakistan became the target of suspicion. Despite the fact that The Pakistani government has officially outlawed LeT since 2002, it has hosted extravagant fund-raising rallies and run urban recruitment centers without interruption. Moreover, on the advice of a former Pakistani Army SWAT operator, it had pioneered the notion of suicidal mass-casualty annihilation in South Asia.
Since independence, India, and Pakistan, two Asian countries sharing a border, have engaged in constant skirmishes. According to Outlook Web Bureau (2022), their long-standing feud is primarily from a contested border of Kashmir that both countries claim as their fiefdom. Subsequently, an ever-existing tension engulfed the two countries hence creating nemesis between them, prompting them to wade war on each other. Moreover, their renowned prowess in nuclear capabilities fueled the tension.
Extensive research following the aftermath of the Mumbai assault encompassed that in October 2009, a Pakistani-American jihadist called David Headley was detained in Denmark for plotting a Mumbai-style terrorist assault. He claimed that he was an American spy working with the drug agency to crack a ravaged crime world in Pakistan (Mahadevan, 2019). Headley is believed to have been linked with the LeT as he conducted surveillance. In fact, the photos and videos he took during that process are believed to have been the fundamentals of the planning of the Mumbai pre-attack. ISI trained David Headley in intelligence collection techniques, and further, he was funded by the LeT.
Furthermore, as per Headley’s evidence before a U.S. court, he had been schooled in intelligence collecting procedures by the ISI. Major Iqbal and Sajid Majeed were his sponsors. Nonetheless, Majeed served as deputy head of the LeT as foreign operations department, where he dealt with jihadists worldwide. His name was connected to terror schemes in Europe, the U.S, and Australia. According to testimony from Western jihadists, he was an influential figure inside LeT. Majeed, in regards to Headley, was in charge of the Mumbai operation. He also said that the ten gunmen who staged the Mumbai attack were mastered by former Pakistani army’s Special Forces members, confirming what Pakistani journalistic inquiry had discovered: professional soldiers were advising LeT.
Headley was convicted on American territory, but the U.S. government refused to repatriate him to India. Some officials in New Delhi believe Washington is trying to safeguard its shaky relationship with the ISI, which would be jeopardized if Headley provided further specifics about the ISI’s role in the 26/11 attacks (Mahadevan, 2019). These same authorities believe the U.S. intelligence community was aware of Headley’s involvement with LeT in Mumbai but ‘missed’ it in the hope that he may assist in the hunt for Osama bin Laden (Mahadevan, 2019). Even throughout the years when it was running him as an agent. LeT held the same opinion of Headley that of, regarding him as an American spy dispatched to infiltrate al-Qaeda but who might also be used to inspect sites in India. Eventually, the U.S. did allow Indian investigators to interrogate Headley since he was affiliated with the ISI. A group that funded the LeT, hence the U.S, believed that if Indians interviewed him and found out their involvement in the attack, they would be an accomplice.
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), meaning Army of the Pure, is a violent Islamist group based in Pakistan. Since its formation in the 1990s, LeT has carried out numerous attacks against military and civilian targets in India, particularly within the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir (Mahadevan, 2019). In addition, they recruit vulnerable youth by preaching anti-corruption policy. The group received significant international attention for its alleged involvement in the attacks of Jammu and Kashmir, the Red Fort in December 2000, the Indian Parliament in 2001, the Delhi bombings in 2005, and the infamous Mumbai attacks in November 200, which is our focal point of discussion. (Mahadevan, 2019) Moreover, LeT is a follower of Ahl-e-Hadith, a South Asian form of Salafism. LeT, like al-Qaeda and other Salafist organizations, wants to reclaim what it calls the country of Muslims.
The Mumbai attack was considered a terrorist attack since it manifested a series of concealed networks in which confidentiality is of the utmost importance during the mission. Such networks are designed so that members can communicate while remaining undetected. Moreover, the networks are designed in distinctive ways that only the perpetrators can understand. The LeT believed that striking India would prompt other nations such as the U.S to focus on India, one of their allies during the Cold War. According to (Tarapore & Brewster 2021) The U.S. was much interested in incarcerating the Al Qaeda group and Osama; they hence were acquaintances with another military group known as Islamabad. The latter was believed to have been the founders of the LeT terrorist group. Therefore, the shifted attention would ensure uncertainties to the real assaulters of the planned already attacked. India was thence seen as a level ground to stage the attack.
Notably, claims were that the incident was part of an ongoing covert warfare effort by the ISI using ‘non-state’ proxies. The event dates back to 1993, years before the 26/11 attack; it asserted that the attack was similar to the Mumbai attack where a massive number of 257 people lost their lives (Lessons from the Mumbai, 2022). The 1993 perpetrators were perceived to be Indian drug lords residing in UAE. Later, the group was believed to have moved to Karachi. As a result, India coerced the U.S to declare Pakistan a state of sponsoring terror. Unfortunately for India U.S was inclined to capture Osama Bin Laden, with who the Pakistanis were helping them.
Even if fought on a limited scale with conventional weapons, a conflict between India and Pakistan would have been disastrous for U.S. interests. The global economy was on the verge of collapse in 2008 (Lessons from the Mumbai, 2022). Banks were collapsing, dwindling employment opportunities, and a harsh recession loomed. The world economy’s declining tendencies would have been intensified if there had been a conflict in South Asia (Mukhopadhyay, 2022). Not only would India’s developing economy be jeopardized, but so would the world economy as a whole. Moreover, the struggle to rid Afghanistan of Al Qaeda and terrorism, the longest war in American history, would have been complicated.
In 2008, Pakistan received a contingent of NATO supplies for the war, the majority of which arrived through Karachi, the port from where the terrorists embarked on their trek to Mumbai. If India and Pakistan went to war, that supply chain would have been put in peril right away (Lessons from the Mumbai, 2022). Al Qaeda and the LeT were well aware of this. The consequences for America and the rest of the world would have been far worse if the conflict had progressed to a nuclear exchange. The Mumbai terrorist attack emphasized the United States’ important interest in India and Pakistan’s ascent as significant world powers. One of its top objectives is to understand how to deal with their emergence as big world powers.
Protecting India through Investigation and Criminal Prosecution
Since 26/11, India has faced some of the most serious terrorist threats. These risks have gotten more diversified and dispersed, making them more challenging to detect and resist Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, other affiliates and a rising number of radical Indian residents. Nevertheless, they are among the organizations and individuals threatening our country. There has also been more variety in techniques, with a preference for smaller, faster-developing plots over larger, longer-term schemes like those carried out on November 26. The Department of Justice has played a critical role in combatting these new dangers, and it continues to adjust its activities. For example, they continue to prosecute more defendants with the most severe terrorist charges in federal court.
Combating Homegrown Violent Extremism
Recently, the Department of Justice has pressed suit against an increasing number of people, both Indian nationals and legal permanent residents, who had become radicalized and taken efforts to act on their extreme views while residing in the United States. While some have worked at the behest of foreign terrorist organizations, many have been lone actors motivated or radicalized by terrorist propaganda but have operated independently of foreign terrorist organizations.
The National Security Division of the Justice Department was established (NSD)
The NSD, the first new Justice Department established in 2008 to consolidate the department’s critical national security parts of a single division to tackle terror threats. The previous Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, the Counterterrorism Section, and the Counterespionage Section were all brought together from different government divisions to establish the division. The NSD has been completed by the new Office of Law and Policy, the Executive Office, and the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism. The NSD’s structure is intended to bring together the law enforcement and intelligence communities’ authority and capabilities to boost national security initiatives.
Private agencies provided investigators that went to further strides in identifying the perpetrators. Moreover, they assisted the government agents and FBI agents in conducting of background checks of foreigners residing in India. Moreover, countries such as the United States were primarily involved after the 26/11 attack. In this regard, they lost 6 of their citizens during the war as well as being affiliated with the attack politically. Further, the security question of their citizen abroad ensued in the U.S. thus; they helped India with the immediate investigation as they dispatched FBI agents to assist with the inquiry.
Following the heinous attack of Mumbai, a worldwide call to ban the terrorist groups sufficed. Due to the intense pressure, it called for the Pakistani government to try and stop the LeT group. Notwithstanding, they were unwilling to call the groups to halt, yet they did not tolerate terrorism. The calls exacerbated by the constant pressure critically hindered their operation, and of course, in 2015, they were banned. Despite being banned by the Pakistani government, they still received massive support from their ardent supporters who tolerated terrorism directed at non-jihadists like the Indians.
The Indian government established key new organizations and legal measures to combat terrorism following the November incidents. On December 17, 2008, the Indian Parliament approved the formation of the National Investigation Agency (NIA), a government counter-terrorism organization with much of the same tasks as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States. Parliament also passed modifications to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which included more restrictive methods to prevent and investigate terrorism. Though there were many dissimilarities around late, 2001, strikes in the United States and the Mumbai attacks, the latter terrorist epidemic was on a far smaller scale regarding deaths and economic repercussions. (Sonawane et al., 2020) The Mumbai assaults, on the other hand, elicited a comparable national and worldwide outrage against such brutality, as well as renewed calls to step up measures to counter the threat of terrorism.
Internationally particularly in the U.S., digital platforms to counter-check terrorism were engineered; an example formation of eGuardian, a web-based program for tracking questionable incident reports, is a critical tool for engaging the public and law enforcement. The threat report is entered into the system as they come in from law enforcement, other federal agencies, and the general public so that they may be monitored, searched, evaluated, and prioritized for action.
Regrettably, for India after the attack, estranged relationships inevitably developed as mistrust and deceit engulfed the whole of India. They felt paranoid of countries’ citizens, and a series of xenophobic attacks were witnessed in some areas. Consequently, a massive decrease in tourism level was seen in the wake of the 26/11 policies implementations as the government encouraged further background checks. The undesired consequence in the tourism sector affected India since tourism was one of the backbones of their economy, a case which they never expected all in all desperate times calls for desperate measure. Moreover, the NIA was ruthless in administering their policies, as tourists could be thoroughly scrutinized before being allowed in India as an impact; it discouraged visitors from traveling to India as some even canceled their tickets (Gunasekar et al., 2018). In addition, the Unlawful Activity Act also stiffens rules for non-Indian citizens; hence it further discouraged tourists from visiting the country.
The response completely fractured India’s relationship with other war-torn countries like Afghanistan, the primary beneficiary of India’s medicines. Exports could hardly leave the country, this negatively affected Afghanistan hence deteriorating their economy. However, it also impacted the economy of India as exports could not fetch the market (Gunasekar et al., 2018). Therefore, it would have been prudent for the Indian government to respond differently post-attack. Their response further subjected many households to the anguish of poverty. In this way, the government delayed disseminating live coverage of how the events unfolded; hence a crisis protocol for news coverage existed, making the situation worse. Instead, reporters and camera persons tried to maneuver their ways to cover the news. If the Indian government had responded correctly, the terrorists would not have taken that long without being cornered; thus, more lives would have been saved.
The government’s pathetic response to the Mumbai attack resulted in widespread criticism as some top officials resigned. Henceforth, the Indian government postulated some policies regarding crisis management. A more tactical approach by the government would have ensured that they averted the threat as soon as possible. In addition, reliable media coverage of the live events would have guaranteed the police knew exactly where the criminals were therefore approaching the situation differently, saving many lives. The nature of the terrorist attack propelled India to develop a radical and sophisticated approach to tackling terrorism. For instance, India developed an innovative and comprehensive system, physical security rooted in an everlasting tactical planning framework and coordinating intelligence, investigation, and crisis management capabilities.
Ad-hocism has typified India’s reaction to terrorism, which has frequently resulted in new agencies, meta-institutional innovation and over-centralization, an appearance of authority generated by technical acquisitions, and governments abdicating their law and order obligations. State governments are focused on retaining power, making it difficult for them to consider the problem in the long run (Rath, 2018). Moreover, further issues manifest as internal security systems are fragmented and poorly coordinated as there are many investigative and law enforcement agencies at the center and in the states. State police forces have their counter-terrorism and intelligence units, which are often weak and work in an isolated manner. There has been an increase in the types and numbers of central paramilitary forces, but the most severe problem is the coordination of their efforts. The central and state agencies coordinate through loosely defined mechanisms, but these are often slow.
The countries method of counter-terrorism is still defective, and this is because recently, in 2016, India was attacked again by a terrorist. Even though Mumbai was more severe, they still could not learn from their mistakes (Wolf, 2021). Moreover, their borders are still porous, and nonetheless, their system is flawed with corruption; hence no one is taking the counter-terrorism issue seriously. Therefore, to curb this menace in January approaches such collaborating the government, media, and the public. (De, 2022). The approach is decisive in long term remedy to the terrorism question. A mutual rapport between the public, government, and media should be more cooperation and discussion. Meaning it is past time for India to seriously consider forming neighborhood “Awake Cells” made up of young activists and concerned individuals. These ‘Awake Cells’ would guarantee that residents aware of security issues act as information feeders to security services, particularly on any odd or suspicious activities in their communities.
Conclusion
The Mumbai attack is one of the most abominable crimes to have ever been witnessed in the history of terrorism. The attack staged by LeT a militant group from Pakistan, it is believed that various ideological difference since time immemorial pioneered the attack. Ultimately, the existence of cold war also intensified the war, in this perspective it was all about targeting interest of United States since India was one of their major allies. In doing so America attention would be shifted towards the attack therefore Soviet Union gaining superiority.
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