Introduction
Operation Anaconda was a military operation in Afghanistan that aimed to root out enemy troops. The process took place in early March 2002, intending to eliminate Taliban and al Qaeda forces that had gathered in Shahikot Valley. The U.S. commanders incorporated a complex battle plan involving a “hammer and anvil” attack. Operation Anaconda was initially estimated as a three-day battle, but it turned into a seven-day struggle with intense combat that was terminated after 17 days. The valley had high ridgelines and limited access routes that provided seclusion, protection for gathering enemy troops, and a natural area for the enemy to regroup its forces. The high ridges were ideal for defense and for guerilla fighters to establish positions to access routes with gunfire. The high altitude, rugged terrain, and foggy weather gave the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters an advantage to repulse an attack.
Success was achieved because of the ability of the U.S. military to incorporate joint operations and modern information networks. The enemy forces did not engage the U.S. in another combat that year. Controversial issues occurred, such as original intelligence estimates, the U.S. command structure, network air-ground coordination of air strikes, and the reliance on Afghan forces. The U.S. military corrected most of the problems encountered, and they did not reappear when operation Iraqi Freedom was launched in 2003. This paper will evaluate factors of the adaptation in battle in Operation Anaconda, such as military setting and intelligence picture, while basing the elements on command principles like competence, commander’s intent, and shared understanding.
The Military Setting: Use of Mission Orders
Mission orders guided the achievement of combat operations and strategies. To end the Taliban government and destroy al Qaeda, U.S. forces ordered the infusion of large ground forces in Afghanistan (Kilbane, 2019). The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) relied on special operation forces (SOF) teams that used satellite radios, lasers, predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and global positioning systems (GPS) to designate air strikes (Kilbane, 2019). The new-era air operation was combined with ground operations of Afghan forces from the Northern Alliance to ensure an effective campaign. On October 19, the Central Intelligence Agency operatives and SOF teams were established (Kilbane, 2019). A two-to-one margin outnumbered the Northern Alliance forces, but with the help of the U.S. precision air strikes, the alliance overpowered its enemy (Kilbane, 2019). Within three weeks, towns such as Taloqan, Kunduz, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif fell over (Kilbane, 2019). The U.S. airstrikes could destroy Taliban bases, air defences, logistic support, and headquarters.
Although the Taliban regime was removed, intelligence reports showed that al Qaeda forces and Taliban remnants gathered in the Eastern White Mountains near the border of Pakistan. Al Qaeda’s top figures, such as Osama Bin Laden, assembled in the Tora Bora region. On November 30, the U.S., SOF, and Afghan ground troops from a local Pashtun militia under Hazrat Ali launched an attack in Tora Bora (Kilbane, 2019). Although the U.S. bombing was intense, the Pashtun militia did not perform effectively, as many enemy troops escaped into Pakistan. U.S. ground forces were not deployed to Afghanistan then; escape routes were not blocked due to insufficient allied ground troops. The battlefield of Tora Bora set the stage for Operation Anaconda.
The Intelligence Picture: Commander’s Intent
The commander’s intent includes the operation’s purpose, critical tasks, and outcome. Operations to discover the number of enemy troops and their hiding places were conducted to develop effective intervention strategies. In mid-January 2002, intelligence reports suggested that enemy forces assembled in Shahikot Valley (Greentree, 2021). The U.S. military officials relied on human intelligence, communications intercepts, and overhead reconnaissance; thus, they lacked good intelligence on the number of enemy fighters and weaponry. The U.S. officials generated estimates of the enemy’s strengths, amounting to 200-300 enemy fighters and 800-1000 Afghan civilians (Greentree, 2021). The estimates created a picture of a weak and demoralized force.
The U.S. officials contemplated that the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters were living in the valley’s villages rather than the mountains and ridgelines; thus, they would try to flee or negotiate a peaceful surrender. The Afghan soldiers were to enter the village and arrest the enemy because they could separate innocent civilians while the U.S. ground troops would block escape routes. The number of enemy troops was considerably higher, and they were heavily armed with heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars (Greentree, 2021). The Taliban and al Qaeda fighters were deployed in the mountains rather than in the villages in concealed positions. The soldiers declared a “jihad” when the Anaconda battle began; instead of fleeing, enemy troops entered the valley from outside (Greentree, 2021). The U.S. and Afghan troops expected brief combat followed by victory, but the enemy put on fierce resistance, causing a high-pitched battle that dragged on for several days and was dislodged after the U.S. bombing (Greentree, 2021). The original battle plan did not survive initial contact with the enemy due to unexpected events.
Multi-Headed Command Structure: Shared Understanding
Shared understanding includes the creation of knowledge through collaboration. When Operation Anaconda began, the U.S. operations were directed by CENTCOM, led by General Franks, who worked through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) (Caruso, 2019). When SOF forces requested air strikes, the decision was made by the CFACC, which worked through Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) (Caruso, 2019). When the interest in the Shahikot Valley grew, General Franks and Mikolashek concluded that a U.S. tactical commander was needed; thus, they turned to MG Franklin Hagenbeck (Caruso, 2019). CENTCOM named General Hagenbeck’s headquarters the Coalition and Joint Force (CJTF) and gave it authority over Operation Anaconda (Caruso, 2019). The general commanded his divisional units, Task Force Dagger and SOF units though he did not have power over Task Force 11, Afghan forces, and the U.S. air component forces (Caruso, 2019). CFACC and CAOC controlled the authority for strike sortie and target; thus, the general and his ground commanders requested air strikes. General Hangenbeck and Task Force Mountain commanded the U.S. ground troops but did not command the air and Afghan units.
Assets and Deficiencies: Competence
The buildup of U.S. ground forces was constrained during the weeks preceding Operation Anaconda to keep a low military profile. Keeping a low profile was an effective way of using knowledge and training so as not to warn the enemy. The U.S. ground forces for Anaconda had six infantry companies which yielded 600 infantry troops, 400 Afghan troops, and 200 SOF troops (Kilbane, 2019). The infantry troop was lightly armed with rifles, mortars, and machine guns, with their heavy firepower consisting of helicopters and gunships, which were under SOF units. The lack of tanks and artillery made it challenging to wage significant combat operations and generate firearms against targets over a hundred meters away. Apart from lacking artillery and tanks, the Afghan troops lacked vehicles for traveling to Shahikot valley. Although the forces lacked resources, they had basic skills and experience in combat.
Developing the Anaconda Battle Plan: Applying Specific Action
Before the assault on Shahikot Valley, Task Force Mountain and its subordinate units prepared a battle plan. The U.S. military planners incorporated a “hammer and anvil” plan to surround the valley with SOF, Afghan troops, and special forces from Australia and other nations. Task Force Hammer functioned as a “hammer” to advance across the valley floor and engage and capture enemy forces (Caruso, 2019). On the other hand, Task Force Rakkasans was to act as the “anvil” by establishing blocking positions (Caruso, 2019). The “hammer and anvil” were required to arrive at the same time to trap the enemy for a successful intervention to victory.
Fewer efforts were put into preparing for tactical air support because they were to play a minor role, thus creating the need for air strikes. General Hagenbeck’s operations led to the involvement of CAFAC and CAOC (Caruso, 2019). When Operation Anaconda was launched, the command-and-control aircraft and the U.S. combat aircraft started circling Shahikot Valley to provide support. The air component provided air strikes and CAS aircraft to orbit the valley. The Task Force Mountain prepared branches and sequels that provided variations on the battlefield and assembling of reinforcements. Although the hammer and anvil operations did not unfold as expected, CAS efforts and ground reinforcements were a major improvise.
Problems in the Shahikot Valley: Accepting Strategic Risks
Operation Anaconda faced various risks that could have led to its defeat. When aircrafts began bombing during the operation, the SOF units requested the process to stop as many friendly troops were endangered (Caruso, 2019). One-half of the enemy troops were bombed when the aircraft halted operations. The Task Force Hammer experienced problems on the road while driving to Whale due to the primitive dirt road. The troop was mistaken for enemy personnel as they approached Guppy and were attacked. The column was struck by enemy mortars while approaching Whale. Despite the adverse events, Task Force Mountain accepted the strategic risks and issued a call for help from U.S. air forces because of the lack of artillery and heavy motors.
The “hammer and anvil” plan was switched with Iraqi freedom, a strategy that was key to winning the battle. Air forces were provided by the Navy and Marine Corps and totaled over 200 bombers, combat support, and fighters (Caruso, 2019). The CAS effort encountered problems in command relationships. Since the CFACC and CAOC retained authority for strike sorties, requesting non-emergency strikes was time-consuming (Caruso, 2019). The Shahikot Valley created a risk of mid-air collisions, thus limiting the number of aircraft to strike targets. As the Anaconda battle progressed, problems encountered in the CAS operation receded. The accumulation of lethal air strikes weakened the enemy by destroying many targets and leading enemy fighters to flee. By March 9, the ground forces took control and closed the remaining passage out of the valley (Caruso, 2019). A large number of enemy troops died while others fled.
Conclusion
Command principles such as shared understanding, risk acceptance, use of mission order, commander’s intent, and competence were used in Operation Anaconda. Although many risks, like negative command relationships, the problems receded as the war continued. The US troops used skills and training when there was a shortage of resources. The use of mission order was incorporated to ensure the completion of operations. Cooperation through shared understanding helped in making decisions easier and more effective. Commander’s intent facilitated tasks that yielded results to be implemented. Although the initial battle plan of Operation Anaconda failed, it was successful in implementing tactical adaptations. Joint networked operations with air forces proved to be efficient in solving problems compared to ground forces.
References
Caruso, D. (2019). Operation Anaconda. Web.
Greentree, T. (2021). What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?. The U.S. Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 51(4), 7-22.
Kilbane, R. E. (2019). Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Delivering Victory (pp. 247-279). Emerald Publishing Limited. Web.