Risk Assessment Matrix: The Challenger Case

Topic: Risk Assessment Words: 816 Pages: 3

In an effort to explore the unknown vastness of space and get more answers about how the universe was formed, humanity is actively building space shuttles and orbiting the solar system. Building, launching, and maintaining these shuttles requires tremendous effort, financial investment, and safety precautions that can lead to tragedy if ignored. One of perhaps the most famous tragic events related to space exploration was the Challenger disaster of early 1986 (The New York Times, 2014). The Space Shuttle Challenger was an experimental spacecraft from NASA that was qualitatively different from the vehicles of the time and was predicted to deliver needed resources to space orbit regularly, significantly increasing the availability of space exploration, including commercial space exploration. However, during a pilot launch in 1986, on January 28, 73 seconds after launch, the external fuel tank ruptured, causing the entire spacecraft to explode and killing all seven crew members. This paper proposes a close examination of this tragedy in terms of risk assessment, including the use of a risk assessment matrix.

Risk	Impact	Occurrence	Impact	Action on Trigger	Responsibility	Response Plan
Rainy weather	Difficulty of takeoff Lack of flight visibility (Winters, n.d.)	M	H	Preliminary weather forecast Sudden clouds and increased humidity	Response Team	Suspend the flight launch Study forecasters’ forecasts for hours ahead, determine possibility of cessation of precipitation Decide on next launch date
Damage to the O-ring	Breaking the integrity of the ring led to the burnout of the external fuel tank, which is directed by the jet	L	H	Disruption of the integrity of the device during the last diagnostic inspection Atypical behavior of the device during altitude climbing	Response Team Diagnostics department Engineering Department Project Management	Report of all responsible departments on the complete operability of the apparatus In case of a malfunction prior to launch – full stop of launch, repair, and evaluation of suitability During altitude climb – crew ejection, saving lives
Loss of communication with the crew	Disruption of communication channels leads to a lack of ability to remotely assess risks Decision-making on the ground can be ineffective in the absence of up-to-date information	M	H	Disconnection of radio communication systems with the crew Shuttle/Houston signal disruption	Crew Response Team Engineers	If possible, put the shuttle into remote autopilot control Control the shuttle from the ground, based on the data coming to the devices Establish redundant communications channels after the shuttle reenters orbit
Collision with space debris	With an increase in unused vehicles in Earth orbit in space darkness, the likelihood of collision with debris increases Collision could lead to shuttle systems failure, depressurization, and death (Tan & Reynolds, 2019)	L	M/H	Known presence of space debris on the shuttle’s trajectory Radar signals from the crew side	Crew Response Team	Evaluate the potential damage from the collision and decide whether further action is necessary Immediately correct the trajectory of the flying device
Conflict between crew members	Disruption of effective communication combined with exacerbation of tense relationships affect good decision making	L/M	H	In the case of international crews, the political environment between countries can exacerbate relations (Domínguez, 2022) Lack of psychological equilibrium among crew members	Crew Psychological support team	Taking the initiative to resolve the conflict If conflict cannot be resolved, restriction of crew rights, remote control of the shuttle

The matrix shown above assesses five different risks that have different probabilities of occurrence and effects on space shuttle launch and operations. These include, in order of probability of occurrence: orbital space debris collision, damage to the O-ring, a conflict between crew members, weather disturbance, and loss of crew communications signal. For some of the presented risks, the probability of occurrence turns out to be intermediate (L/M) because it depends on a specific case and cannot be generalized. However, the risks have been chosen so that only one of them, interpersonal conflict, has an intermediate effect on the shuttle operation; all other risks lead to significant disruptions, up to and including disaster, like the Challenger tragedy.

It is a mistake to think that a low probability of risk occurrence is associated with a lower priority of attention to the problem. The Challenger tragedy, which is almost exceptional and strictly related to a secondary fuel tank O-ring, demonstrated the opposite pattern (The New York Times, 2014). What this means is that attention should be paid first to those risks that may have the highest effect on shuttle performance, but less significant potential problems should not be ignored. As the 1986 case showed, the tragedy might not have happened if NASA management had been effective and listened to the advice of engineers. Management’s lack of literacy and desire to achieve results in spite of apparent safety issues is not an uncommon problem for large companies: for example, Boeing repeated the NASA tragedy in 2018 and 2019 (White, 2020). Consequently, the answer to such threats is to listen carefully to the team that designs and implements flight preparations and to respond to any, even the slightest risk, allowing for accountability and transparency, bypassing tragedies.

References

Domínguez, N. (2022). How the crew of the International Space Station could become unlikely collateral victims of the conflict in Ukraine. El Pais. Web.

Tan, A., & Reynolds, R. C. (2019). Theory of satellite fragmentation in orbit. WSPC.

The New York Times. (2014). Space shuttle Challenger disaster: Major malfunction | retro report | The New York Times [Video]. YouTube. Web.

White, R. (2020). Homeland security the five-w’s [PDF document]. Web.

Winters, K. (n.d.). Ask the mission team — Question and answer session. NASA. Web.