The Atlanta Campaign in the American Civil War

Introduction

The Atlanta Campaign was a critical battle series in Georgia that influenced the 1864 Federal presidential election and led to the cutting off the Confederate supply center. Towards the end of 1863, Atlanta assumed an all-important role in the region by becoming a logical point where Union forces could attack in their campaign against the west. To the north of Atlanta were Vicksburg, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Chattanooga, and to the south was a significant manufacturing, supply, and Confederate railroad center that served as the gateway to the lower south¹. General William Sherman, the Union commander, believed the entire war would end by a continuous crusade deep into the Confederate terrain. Until Lieutenant General John Bell Hood, the southern defenders received their strategic command from General Joseph E. Johnson. Specifically, the Atlanta Campaign lasted almost five months of small actions and unbroken skirmishes and included nine individual battles.

Later in 1864, the Atlanta Campaign foreshadowed Sherman’s march to the sea resulting in the introduction of total war consequences and horrors among southern civilians, purposed to undermine the morale of the Confederate. However, as forced by Sherman on August 31 and September 1, the Atlanta Confederate evacuation took place after a series of seesaw battles². In the fall of 1864, the Union victory led by Sherman presented President Abraham Lincoln with an opportunity for reelection. The Confederate position was complicated with the troops at Virginia’s Southern Richmond capital contending with the Union forces at the northern and southern borders.

Context and Aim of The Atlanta Campaign

Following the direction of his superior, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, Sherman intended to advance to Atlanta, Georgia, from his Tennessee’s Chattanooga post. The city of Atlanta was Confederacy’s strategic point that served as a supply depot, railroad terminus, and manufacturing hub³. With Atlanta’s geographic position south of Richmond, Virginia, the Confederate’s capital, capturing the city would threaten the Confederate’s stability⁴. The Confederates would swiftly end the American Civil War with the city’s fall. Moreover, to Union President Abraham Lincoln, the Atlanta Campaign was of special significance given that in the north, 1864 was a presidential election year⁵. Both the democrats and the republicans wanted the American Civil War to end alongside the hostilities associated with it. The dissatisfaction with the dragged war was a threat to Lincoln’s reelection bid and his second term largely relied on the success or failure of the Atlanta Campaign.

Strategic Overview of The Atlanta Campaign

Major General William T. Sherman started engaging the Tennessee Confederate Army in early May 1864, and at stake was the railroad hub and the major manufacturing center in Atlanta. With a troop of 110,000 men forming three armies around Chattanooga, Sherman faced the Tennessee Confederate Army at Dalton⁶. The Confederate Army, led by General Joseph E. Johnston, eight miles of Atlanta’s north, had 54,500 men and officers ready for duty⁷. A reinforcement of 15,000 officers and men joined Johnston’s army with the month, making his army the largest in the south⁸. Despite having the numbers, Johnston’s plan relied on holding a strong self-protective position and waiting for the enemy to attack.

Sherman had numerical supremacy over his enemies but never used it in blunt forward attacks, the strategy used by Grant against Lee in Virginia. Instead, he depended on the demonstrations, by the two Major Generals John M. Schofield and George H. Thomas army of the Ohio and Cumberland, respectively, against the rebel lines⁹. Further, Sherman sent Major General James B. McPherson and his army to maneuver on the left flank of Johnston and threatened his supply lines, the Atlantic and Western Railroad¹⁰. Throughout the Atlanta Campaign, the strategy was used repeatedly against Johnston’s starting May 12 retreat at Rocky Face Ridge.

While McPherson and Johnston’s armies traded sharp, short attacks at Resaca on May 14 and 15, McPherson proceeded to cross River Oostanaula, forcing Johnston to retreat¹¹. With Johnston’s army failing to attack Sherman’s army on May 19 at Cassville, the front shifted to Dallas-New Hope Church-Pickett’s Mill area from across River Etowah. At the new front, an inconclusive battle took place between May 25 and 28¹². Responding to Sherman’s assaults on June 27, Johnston dug in at Kennesaw Mountain before being bordered again. Sherman feinted right on approaching River Chattahoochee and got his troops upstream. On July 9 and 10, the Johnson-led army retreated to Atlanta.

Lieutenant General John B. Hood replaced Johnston, on President Jefferson Davis’ command, due to his inability to attack Sherman and gain territory. The change was made effective on July 8, when the Northern forces numbered 80,000 and were five miles outside of Atlanta¹³. Fifty thousand officers faced difficult odds, pinned in Atlanta’s fortifications, but held the position to satisfy an administration wish that Atlanta would not be given up without a fight. Hood, on July 20, tried but unsuccessfully battled against Thomas’ army that was north of Atlanta at Peach Tree Creek, and two days later, he sent Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee and his army to carry out a flank attack¹⁴. Every bit of the attack was audacious as the Stonewall Jackson’s attack at Chancellorsville. In what was considered one of the bloodiest attacks of the Atlanta Campaign, Union army commander McPherson was killed by Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee’s men. The Confederates were eventually repelled in what seemed like Hood’s closest attempt to victory.

Sherman intended to capture Atlanta, and therefore, he did not assault the strongest earthworks that surrounded the city. Sherman starved Hood and his men by cutting Atlanta’s railroads. The Union army cut the lines running Augusta westwards, and the Alabama cavalry destroyed the railroad line to Montgomery. Hood and his army relied only on the Western and Macon Railroad. The battles at Ezra Church and Utoy Creek resulted from Sherman’s movement west of Atlanta on July 28 and August 5-7, respectively¹⁵. Sherman’s artillery bombarded Atlanta alongside the thousands of residents there as Hood extended his lines in August. Federal cavalry raids aimed to cut the Western and Macon Railroad but failed dismally. At the same time, the attempt to cut Sherman’s rail line by Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler and his cavalry, into Tennessee and north Georgia, failed under Hood’s command.

On August 25, Sherman’s final move was rolled, and he sent most of his infantry corps on a wide swing at Atlanta via Jonesborough, which was 17 miles south of the city. The sole purpose was to cut the remaining railroads. With the arrival of the Union troops at the railroad on August 31, Atlanta’s last lifeline was eventually cut¹⁶. Hood abandoned the city on the eve of September 1, and Atlanta surrendered to Federal forces immediately with his departure. During the four months of the campaign, the number engaged in the Atlanta Campaign from the northern and southern sides were approximately 34,863 and 40,438, respectively¹⁷. The Confederacy encountered a major blow by capturing the city, but the win assured President Abraham Lincoln’s reelection in the upcoming two months. The win also set the stage for Sherman’s capture of Savannah and march to the sea.

The Union Advantage in the Campaign

With his March appointment as Union armies’ general-in-chief, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant placed his trusted subordinate Sherman command of three Union armies. The three Union armies were located between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains. Under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas was the Cumberland army, under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson was the Tennessee army and under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield was the Ohio army. In April, Sherman brought the three armies together to form the 110,000 officers and men alongside 250 canons around Chattanooga¹⁸. The Confederate Tennessee army faced the Sherman army near Dalton, defeated and driven from Missionary Ridge in November 1863. The Confederate army, led by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, numbered 54,500 men and officers and had 154 artillery pieces¹⁹. Johnston had been responsible for snapping the army back into shape during the previous winter.

Neither Gen, Sherman nor Gen. Johnston knew the instructions given them by their superiors were about taking Atlanta as a military objective. Sherman’s order from Grant was simple: move against Johnston’s army, break it up, and get as far into the army’s country as possible²⁰. While at it, Sherman was to wreck Johnston’s army resources along the way. To the Confederate, President Davis’ command was to advance back to Tennessee. Based on the Sherman army’s number, Johnston argued against the command, knowing he would be blocked and was already outnumbered, meaning he could assume no offensive²¹. Johnston’s logic against Davis’ command was accepted reluctantly, resulting in the Confederates standing defensive. Johnston’s army was aware that Sherman’s thrust would be to Atlanta, a pivotal industrial occupation and railroad center, which determined the war’s outcome.

Sherman’s success confidence was supreme with the knowledge of his troop’s superior number and morale, and he shrewdly anticipated Johnston’s passive disposition. On April 10, Sherman sent outlines to his superior Grant for taking Atlanta once he successfully pushed Johnston back to it. Initially, Sherman maneuvered around the city and successfully cut the city’s supplying railroads, and subsequently, he pushed farther into Georgia²². While Sherman was confident, Johnston was pessimistic and fearful at the beginning of the campaign. Johnston called for reinforcements while trying to hold the lines and even seemed doubtful of his abilities to manage his men at the line.

The Battle

As Sherman departed Chattanooga and the news traveled to Atlanta, Johnston and the Confederate army forced their slaves to erect two fortification rings around the city. The inner ring, compared to the outer one, was heavily defended. However, the erection of the outer ring comprised an earthen palisade series alongside trenches that were to slow down the Union army²³. Along with both rings, cannon batteries were positioned, and from the fortifications, Hood’s army departed on the eve of July 22. Hood left two corps behind the inner ring, having given an order to the cavalry and infantry numbered between 17,000 and 18,000 officers and men²⁴. To the officers and the men, the order was to advance east and south relative to Sherman’s left flank’s general direction. The aim was to swing north and strike the Union army, in the early morning, in a weakened rear²⁵. The cavalry was to wheel around to damage Sherman’s supply train, hoping the train was unprotected.

Sherman had sent his army to Tennessee via Gen. James B. McPherson to cut off and damage the Georgia Railroad that entered east of Atlanta. Sherman had established temporal headquarters at the Augustus Hurt House, having moved his field headquarters to Decatur, the nearest center, 3.2 kilometers, east of Atlanta²⁶. McPherson advanced towards Georgia while Sherman took a commanding look at Atlanta’s defenses from the top. On learning about Hood’s move on the eve of July 22, Sherman commanded his army to hunt Hood down. However, intelligence at Union realized the continuous presence of the Confederate’s army defenders that contradicted Sherman’s initial situation, and Sherman was forced to retract his earlier orders. On Gen. McPherson’s advice, Sherman considered the seriousness of the vulnerability that would occur should he have sent an infantry corps away from his left flank²⁷. The decision to leave the infantry in place proved successful to the Union to maintain its position in the following battle.

In an L-shaped formation, McPherson arranged his troop of nearly 35,000 soldiers with the horizontal arm traversing east-west and the vertical arm traversing north-south²⁸. On Bald Hill, later known as Leggett’s Hill, McPherson reinforced his flank using cannons and fortified his line using trenches. Hood’s attack plan was logical; however, his soldiers’ encounter with the rough terrain proved challenging, resulting in a delayed start to their march²⁹. Moreover, Hood had little intelligence about McPherson’s extent line, meaning Hood’s infantry commander could not accurately determine when to swing north. As such, instead of surprising McPherson from the rear, Hood and his infantry’s final assumption was not only south of the entrenched left flank but was also six hours late³⁰.

Hood and his Confederate army engaged McPherson at the east-west line shortly in the afternoon, and from his post, McPherson could hear gunshots and ensured the Union leaders on that line held their position. While inspecting the rest of the Union army, McPherson found a sizeable chink in his position where the vertical and horizontal arms intersected. He galloped towards the intersection that happened to be the site of an intensified Confederate support. Hood’s infantry from the area quickly noticed McPherson and shot him from his saddle, leading to his death shortly afterward. McPherson became the highest-ranking Union general and Grant’s protégé to be killed in battle.

The Union army continued to hold its line despite the untimely death of its commander, specifically atop Bald Hill along the north-south line. The battle was concentrated on this strategic high ground that was the highest raised point between Decatur and Atlanta³¹. In successive waves rushing the hill, the Confederate army engaged the Union army in vicious combat. However, despite exploiting the gap in the Union position and almost succeeding in attacking the line through several commands, the hill remained unseized by Hood’s infantry.

Later in the afternoon, another weak point, at an exposed railroad cut to the north, at the Union line was assaulted by the Confederate army. The Union army was forced to retreat eastwards, and the army lost Captain Francis DeGress’s artillery battery and the Troup Hurt House in the process³². Nonetheless, a strong counterattack by Sherman’s artillery Union commander fired behind and on Hood’s line preventing reinforcements from reaching the Troup Hurt House. Hood’s infantry was repulsed several times, and the countless bloodsheds led the Confederate army to retreat to Atlanta by nightfall. Hood and his men almost succeeded in their mission, with the corps taking Decatur, but the tenacity of Sherman’s Union commander stalled them from damaging the wagon train. With the news of the infantry corps’ sound defeat, the cavalry corps’ leader ordered his soldiers to fall back to Atlanta.

The outcome of The Atlanta Campaign

Sherman and the Union army successfully captured one-tenth of the Confederate soldiers. From the 34,863 Union troops, 3,722 were reported missing, wounded, captured, or killed, while from the 40,438 engaged Confederate army, 5,500 were reported casualties of the campaign³³. After capturing the city and overseeing its operations for two months, Sherman ordered the destruction of Atlanta’s business district in Georgia. Having known he would not remain in Atlanta for long, after capturing it, Sherman’s tenuous supply line ran through Chattanooga, in Tennessee, from Nashville, and one hundred miles via mountainous northern Georgia. The Tennessee army Sherman had just defeated but remained in the area. John Hood thought by swinging around; he would destroy Sherman’s lifeline. Nonetheless, the main concern for the Union army was the Confederate cavalry led by Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest. Forrest was a bright commander who could damage the river ad rail transports that Sherman and his men relied on. Despite the Union army dealing a crippling blow to the Confederate army, the defensive force was indecisive.

With Atlanta’s fall, Sherman conceived a plan to split his huge army. Under commander Thomas, he sent part of the army to Nashville to handle Hood’s malicious plan to destroy the Union. Sherman arranged to take the remaining troop through to Georgia. In October, Sherman established an enormous supplies cache in Atlanta, and afterward, he ordered Atlanta’s systematic destruction³⁴. The move prevented the Confederates from recovering any munition once Sherman and his troops had abandoned the city. One estimate shows that approximately 40 percent of the city was destroyed³⁵. Sherman applied the same destruction policy throughout Georgia in his march to Savannah. Before his November 15 departure, Sherman’s troop ensured to burn Atlanta’s industrial area leaving behind a little but a smoking shell. Moreover, Atlanta played a major role in the American Civil War. With its commercial importance and location, the city served as a military operation and a supply route through the Confederate troops in the Civil War³⁶. Based on this, the Union army focused on the city to weaken the Confederate military organization.

From a political standpoint, the consequence of the Atlanta Campaign was noteworthy for President Lincoln. In the 1864 election, a democrat and former Union general, Gen. George B. McClellan, ran against the president. His campaign strategy was built on a peace platform where he called for a truce with the Confederates. However, with the capture of the city and later Gen. Hood, the morale of the northern side was boosted. The evacuations and burning down part of the city significantly resulted in the reelection of President Lincoln.

Atlanta was a contrarian city that chose Unionist democratic candidate John Bell over John C. Breckinridge, a successionist candidate. However, the 1860’s pivotal election almost precisely reversed statewide polling. The votes for Bell combined with those for Stephen A. Douglas was a clear demonstration of the Atlantans’ preference for the Union³⁷. However, the city took up the Confederate nation-building cause using the same zeal applied in its rise. The city’s residents quickly rallied to the new Confederate cause, and Atlanta became the city that gave the largest number of volunteers, of any state, at the first call to arms³⁸. The Atlanta Grays and the Gate City Guards became the two standing Atlanta militia firms that mustered for State and Confederate armies. Other new regiments swiftly followed, and despite Fulton’s initial resistance, the county was among those giving thousands of Atlanta men to the battlefields. Before the American Civil War, Fulton County had given 2,660 men to the Confederacy.

Conclusion

The Union army initiated the Atlanta Campaign hoping that with the city’s fall, the Confederates would swiftly end the American Civil War. Moreover, to Union President Abraham Lincoln, the Atlanta Campaign was of special significance given that in the north, 1864 was a presidential election year. Sherman established an enormous supplies cache in Atlanta, and afterward, he ordered Atlanta’s systematic destruction. The move prevented the Confederates from recovering any munition once Sherman and his troops had abandoned the city. The city of Atlanta was Confederacy’s strategic point that served as a supply depot, railroad terminus, and manufacturing hub. With Atlanta’s geographic position, south of Richmond, Virginia, Confederate’s capital, capturing the city would mean threatening the Confederate’s stability.

Bibliography

Allison, David, Lisa P. Rickey, and Blaise J. Arena. 2018. Attacked on all sides: the Civil War Battle of Decatur, Georgia, the untold story of the Battle of Atlanta. David Allison.

Bradley, Mark L. 2018. “Book Review: The Battle of Ezra Church and the Struggle for Atlanta”. Army History. (106): 53-54.

Brueske, Paul. 2020. “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta by Earl J. Hess”. Alabama Review. 73 (2): 174-176.

Brown, Thomas J. 2017. “Monuments and Ruins: Atlanta and Columbia Remember Sherman”. Journal of American Studies. 51 (2): 411-436.

Bui, L. Bao. 2018. “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta”. Civil War Book Review. 20 (1).

Clifford, James H. 2018. “Book Review: The Battle of Peachtree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta”. On Point. 23 (4): 54.

Davis, Stephen, “Atlanta Campaign.” New Georgia Encyclopedia, 2018. Web.

Foote, Lorien, and Earl J. Hess. 2021. The Oxford handbook of the American Civil War. Oxford University Press. Web.

Hess, Earl J. 2020. Battle of Peach Tree Creek: hood’s first effort to save Atlanta. [Place of publication not identified]: UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA PR.

Kraszewski, Kenneth. 2019. “SamSam and the Silent Battle of Atlanta”. 900: 1-16.

Noe, Kenneth W. 2018. “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta”. Journal of American History. 105 (2): 408-408.

Peterson, Lawrence K., and Tim Kissel. 2019. Decisions of the Atlanta Campaign: the twenty-one critical decisions that defined the operation. The University of Tennessee Press.

Pollock, Daniel. 2021. “Spectacles of American Nationalism: The Battle of Atlanta Cyclorama Painting and The Birth of a Nation”. Southern Spaces.

Sawula, Christopher. 2017. “The Battle of Atlanta: Past vs. Present in ATL Maps”. Atlanta Studies. Atlanta Studies.

Taylor, Robert A. 2019. “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta, by Earl J. Hess”. Journal of Military History. 83 (1): 246-246.

Footnotes

• 1 Allison, David, Lisa P. Rickey, and Blaise J. Arena. 2018. Attacked on all sides: the Civil War Battle of Decatur, Georgia, the untold story of the Battle of Atlanta. David Allison.
• 2 Allison et al., 2018.
• 3 Brown, Thomas J. 2017. “Monuments and Ruins: Atlanta and Columbia Remember Sherman”. Journal of American Studies. 51 (2): 411-436.
• 4 Brown, 2017.
• 5 Bradley, Mark L. 2018. “Book Review: The Battle of Ezra Church and the Struggle for Atlanta”. Army History. (106): 53-54.
• 6 Bradley, 2018.
• 7 Brueske, Paul. 2020. “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta by Earl J. Hess”. Alabama Review. 73 (2): 174-176.
• 8 Brueske, 2020.
• 9 Bui, L. Bao. 2018. “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta”. Civil War Book Review. 20 (1).
• 10 Bui, 2018.
• 11 Bui, 2018.
• 12 Clifford, James H. 2018. “Book Review: The Battle of Peachtree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta”. On Point. 23 (4): 54.
• 13 Clifford, 2018.
• 14 Davis, Stephen, “Atlanta Campaign.” New Georgia Encyclopedia, Web.
• 15 Davis, 2018.
• 16 Davis, 2018.
• 17 Foote, Lorien, and Earl J. Hess. 2021. The Oxford handbook of the American Civil War. Oxford University Press. Web.
• 18 Foote and Earl, 2021.
• 19 Foote and Earl, 2021.
• 20 Hess, Earl J. 2020. Battle of Peach Tree Creek: hood’s first effort to save Atlanta. [Place of publication not identified]: UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA PR.
• 21 Hess, 2020.
• 22 Hess, 2020.
• 23 Kraszewski, Kenneth. 2019. “SamSam and the Silent Battle of Atlanta”. 900: 1-16.
• 24 Kraszewski, 2019.
• 25 Noe, Kenneth W. 2018. “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta”. Journal of American History. 105 (2): 408-408.
• 26 Noe, 2018.
• 27 Noe, 2018.
• 28 Peterson, Lawrence K., and Tim Kissel. 2019. Decisions of the Atlanta Campaign: the twenty-one critical decisions that defined the operation. The University of Tennessee Press.
• 29 Peterson et al., 2019.
• 30 Peterson et al., 2019.
• 31 Pollock, Daniel. 2021. “Spectacles of American Nationalism: The Battle of Atlanta Cyclorama Painting and The Birth of a Nation”. Southern Spaces
• 32 Pollock, 2021
• 33 Pollock, 2021
• 34 Sawula, Christopher. 2017. “The Battle of Atlanta: Past vs. Present in ATL Maps”. Atlanta Studies. Atlanta Studies.
• 35 Sawula, 2017
• 36 Taylor, Robert A. 2019. “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta, by Earl J. Hess”. Journal of Military History. 83 (1): 246-246.
• 37 Taylor, 2019
• 38 Taylor, 2019